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Abstract:
Using the state level data from India, this paper investigates the size
of the hidden economy in Indian states over the period 1974/75 to 1995/96.
Our analysis has shown that after liberalization of the Indian economy in
1991/92, the growth in the size of the hidden economy has decreased on an
average. Our results show that the growth in the size of the hidden economy
is approximately 4% less in scheduled election years than in all other years.
We also demonstrate that the growth is significantly lower in those states
where the coalition government is in power. An increased growth of
newspapers and the literacy rates translate to cleaner governance, e.g. to
fewer amounts of shadow economy activities in the economy.
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1. Introduction
Economists and social scientists have shown considerable interest
in recent years to measure the gap between the observable and the
actual. This has led to the conceptualization of the ‘hidden economy’,
although several synonyms such as black, shadow, underground,
unobserved, unofficial, unrecorded, and parallel were used for the
‘hidden economy’. In general, it tries to capture the activities beyond
measurement by official activity.2 The hidden economy consists of
legal and illegal activities outside the reach of the government.3
Empirical estimates demonstrate that underground activities have
been on the rise since the 1970s when the presence of government
activity became stronger in the economies around the world. With
increase in tax rates to finance larger public spending programs, the
desire to escape taxes and regulatory restrictions also gained in
prominence (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1997). Popular print-media
articles were also ready to accept the notion that the underground
economy had increased significantly over the years. Given such media
attention, the nexus of the black economy into the public glare has
created a consciousness about the gravity of the phenomenon all over
the world.
Given the importance of the phenomenon, the next question that
naturally arises is regarding the definition of the hidden economy.
Tanzi (1999) suggests that the shadow economy crops up because of
presence of activities that are difficult to measure and tax, like
household work and also criminal and illegal activities. Schneider
(1986) sums this point by defining the underground economy as “all
economic activities that contribute to the value added and should be
included in national income in terms of national accounting
conventions but are presently not registered by national measurement
agencies”. Bhattacharyya (1999) describes the hidden economy as
reflected by the unrecorded national income “calculated as the
difference between the potential national income for the given
currency in circulation and the recorded national income”. Bagachwa
and Naho (1995) consider it as a combination of informal (small-scale
production and distribution units), parallel (illegal production of legal
activities) and black market activities (production and distribution of
market and non-market goods forbidden by the government). Acharya
(1985), in the Indian context, refers to the black economy as “the
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aggregate of incomes which are taxable but are not reported to the tax
authorities” and also “the extent to which estimates of national income
and output are biased downwards because of deliberate, false
reporting of incomes, output and transactions for reasons of tax
evasion, flouting of other economic controls and related motives”. A
commonly used working definition is: all currently unregistered
economic activities, which contribute to the officially calculated (or
observed) Gross National Product.4 Smith (1985, p. 18) defines it as
“market-based production of goods and services whether legal or
illegal that escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP”.
The above discussion suggests that the shadow or hidden economy
deals with the portion of the income earned from legal and illegal
activities that cannot be accounted for by the standard measurement
procedures used in compilation of national income accounts. We, in
this paper, adopt this as a relatively broad definition of the
‘underground economy’.
In this paper, we try to estimate the size of the hidden (shadow)
economy for fourteen major states of India over the period 1974/75 to
1995/96 using a multiple indicator multiple cause (MIMIC) model.
Given the estimates of the size of the shadow economy, we also offer
an empirical investigation to determine the role of socioeconomic,
political and institutional factors explaining the size of the hidden
economy. Our approach thus demonstrates the importance of policy
actions in increasing government responsiveness to curb the size of
the hidden economy. We particularly emphasize on the role of election,
nature of the governments, literacy, mass media, and the impact of
liberalization in this context. Kaufman (1999) considers knowledge and
information; leadership and collective action can be used as the prime
weapons to tackle corruption. Stapenhurst (2000) provides a brief link
between an active media and the amelioration of corruption as also the
shadow activities of the economy. Djankov et al. (2002) demonstrate
that the government ownership of the media is generally associated
with less press freedom, fewer political and economic rights, and, most
importantly, inferior social outcomes in the areas of education and
health. Ahrend (2002) provides strong empirical evidence that
suggests that strengthening press freedom should be among the
priorities fighting against corruption. Dyck and Zingales (2002) discuss
the role of the media influencing corporate policy.
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India provides an interesting framework. India has been a
democracy since 1947. Periodic elections to the national and state
legislative assemblies have taken place since 1952. There is a
relatively free and independent press with significant time-series and
cross-sectional Variation. Using these data, we are able to examine a
connection between the development of mass media, political and
institutional factors and government actions to cater the needs of the
citizens. In this connection, our paper can be viewed in line with the
growing literature that uses data from India to examine the role of
institutional and political factors to explain government
responsiveness. Besley and Burgess (2000) demonstrate that party
ideology affects public policy: the cumulative land reforms passed in a
given state-year depend on the 4-year lagged state legislative
assembly seat shares of different political groups. Besley and Burgess
(2002) show that state governments are more responsive to falls in
food production and crop damage in those states where newspaper
circulation is higher and electoral accountability is greater. Banerjee
and Iyer (2004) document that differences in historical institutions
lead to very different policy choices, and hence to, differences in
economic outcomes. Iyer (2004) demonstrates that areas under direct
British rule have significantly lower levels of public goods in the
present period. Hoff (2003) provides a survey relating institutional
developments and its impact on economic growth. However, none of
the above-mentioned papers has addressed the issue of the size of the
unofficial economy in the Indian state context. Our paper is an attempt
in this direction.
The Wanchoo Committee Report (Government of India, Ministry of
Finance, 1971, p. 6) was the first to draw attention on the shadow
economy in India. They referred to the phenomenon as a “cancerous
growth in the country's economy which if not checked in time, will
surely lead to its ruination”. The Venkatappiah Committee Report
(Government of India, 1974), which focused on the self-removal of
excise taxes also felt “free to confess that we are not prepared for, and
are, therefore, painfully surprised at, the range, diversity and, in
certain segments of production, almost the universality of the evasion,
which is practiced by those who produce the goods”. Besides taxes,
the extent of regulation present in the economy in the form of
industrial licensing, import licensing, controls on prices and distribution
channels of goods and services, credit controls and other measures
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can encourage the proliferation of the hidden economy. The Dagli
Committee Report (1979) highlighted this phenomenon.
The remaining parts of the paper are organized in the following
manner. The next section presents a brief review of the literature for
estimation of the size of the hidden economy. Section 3 discusses the
estimation methodology. Section 4 is divided in to three subsections:
the first subsection lists out the basic data variables used in the
analysis, the second one document the nature of the hidden economy
estimates obtained by the used methodology, and the last deals with
the role of political and institutional factors explaining the size of the
hidden economy. Section 5 concludes.

2. Methods of measuring the hidden economy
Our study is different from the earlier underground economy
studies conducted in the Indian context by Gupta and Mehta (1981),
Chopra (1982), Acharya (1985), Bhattacharyya (1999), and
Bhattacharyya and Ghose (1998) in the following way:
1) While Acharya (1985), Bhattacharyya (1999), and Bhattacharyya
and Ghose (1998) used traditional cash demand estimation
methodology, which has been criticized in the literature for its
focus on just one facet of the hidden economy, this work uses the
MIMIC model. Gupta and Mehta (1981) have used a physical input
approach where as Chopra's method is in close line with the one
suggested by Kaldor (1956).5
2) The uniqueness of the study hinges on the fact that it addresses
the crucial question: Does an increase in the presence of civic
institutions like media have a contractionary effect on the size of
the hidden economy of a democracy like India?
In this paper, we attempt to estimate the hidden economy by
multiple indicator multiple cause approach (MIMIC). Frey and WeekHannemann (1984) were the first to employ this methodology for the
estimation of the hidden economy of a cross-section of 17 OECD
countries for the period of 1960-78. They borrowed from the statistical
theory of unobserved variables developed by the likes of Zellner
(1970), Goldberger (1972) and Joreskog and Goldberger (1975) which
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considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of the phenomenon
to be measured and used a factor-analytic approach to measure the
hidden economy as an unobserved variable over time. The unknown
coefficients are estimated separately through a set of structural
equations with the indicator variables being used to capture the effect
of the unobserved variables indirectly. Frey and Week-Hannemann
(1984) provided a ranking of OECD countries based on the size of their
underground economies. In the late 1970s, Scandinavian and Benelux
countries were seen to have very large hidden economies followed by
US in the middle rank and then by Switzerland and Japan, which
exhibit very small sizes of underground activity for that period. Also
growth rates wise, Denmark, Belgium, and Italy’s hidden segment
seem to have grown at an above average pace while Canada, UK and
USA’s hidden economy was found to be below the average rate.
Another study by Aigner et al. (1988) uses a variant of the MIMIC
approach − the DYMIMIC (the dynamic multiple-indicators multiplecauses approach) to assess the size of the US hidden economy for the
period 1939-1982. The results of this study have found a peak in the
US hidden economy size around 1943-44 and a trough in 1967-68.
In recent years, a lot of work has been done using the unobserved
or latent variable approach, particularly in the context of New Zealand
and Canada. Giles (1999a,b), Giles and Caragata (2001), and Giles
and Tedds (2002) have used the time series data for the New Zealand
and the Canadian economy, to arrive at hidden economy estimates,
using the MIMIC approach. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first attempt to estimate the size of the hidden economy using MIMIC
model in the Indian context.

3. Estimation methodology
This section describes in brief the MIMIC variable approach. The
MIMIC model actually is a variant of the LISREL (linear independent
structural relationships) models of Joreskog and Sorbom (1993a,b)
and others that can only yield a time-series index for the latent
variables: an ordinal index. We need to convert ordinal index into a
cardinal series of values of hidden economy sizes by scaling up the
ordinal values to some cardinal value that has been obtained in the
past through other methods of estimation like the electricity or the
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currency demand approach. The MIMIC model equations can be stated
as:
y = λη + ε

(1)

η = γ'x + ζ

(2)

where y is a column vector of ‘p’ indicators of the latent variable, η,
and x is a column vector of the ‘q’ “causes” of η. In other words, Eq.
(1) is the measurement model for η and Eq. (2) is the structural
equation for the latent variable, η. ε is a (px1) measurement error
while ζ is the scalar structural error. It is assumed that ζ and all the
elements of ε are mutually uncorrelated, with var(ζ) = ψ , and cov(ε)
= θε . Substituting (2) into (1), the MIMIC model can be expressed as
a p-equation multivariate regression model:
y = Πx + z

(3)

where Π = λγ′, z = λζ + ε, and cov(z) = λλ′ψ + θε.
The p-equation model in (3) seems to have a regression matrix
of rank equal to one and an error covariance matrix that is similarly
constrained. The first condition is typical in simultaneous equation
models where the removal of a few exogenous variables from the
structural equation might cause a part of the reduced form coefficient
matrix to be short-ranked. The singularity property of the error
covariance matrix develops because for the measurement model to be
estimated it has to be normalized first. This implies that the estimation
of (1) and (2) can be carried only after (1) is normalized by setting
one element of λ to a pre-assigned value. We estimate the model
using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure.
We use the following combinations of the causes and indicators
to arrive at different hidden economy estimates. For the indicators, we
use the growth in real net state domestic product of the Indian states
(Grsdp)6 and the total number of employees (sum of productive and
non-productive workers) in registered manufacturing industries
adjusted by the total number of factories in a state (Temp). For the
causal variables, we have included the following: capital account
developmental expenditure (Capdev), capital account nondevelopmental expenditure (Cqndev), states’ own tax revenue (Otr),
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states’ own non-tax revenue (Ontr), states’ current account
developmental expenditure (Curdev), and states’ current account nondevelopmental expenditure (Curndev). All the expenditures and tax
variables are expressed as a proportion of states’ net domestic
product.
The total revenue of a state government consists of two
components: total tax revenue, and total non-tax revenue. A state
government’s total tax revenue is, in turn, decomposed into two parts:
its share in the tax revenue of the central government and revenue
raised through state taxes. State taxes are mainly indirect in natures.7
A state government’s non-tax revenue derives from two sources:
grants from the central government, and own non-tax revenue. The
interest receipts from loans issued by the state government, dividends
and profits from public sector undertakings owned by the state
government, and revenues from state lotteries are the major
constituents of the non-tax revenue. In this paper, we use the own tax
revenue and own non-tax revenue components of total revenue. The
total expenditures incurred by state governments are on either the
current account or the capital account. Current account expenditure is
of three types: developmental spending, non-developmental spending
and grants to local governments. Developmental current account
spending mainly meets the need to maintain the existing assets mainly
in terms of economic services (inclusive of expenditure on agriculture,
industry, power and irrigation, transport and communications) and
social services (inclusive of education, health and family welfare,
planned expenditure on social security), where as non-developmental
part consists of interest payments on past debts, expenditure on fiscal
and administrative services, pension and retirement benefits, nonplanned expenditure on social security and welfare and food subsidy.
Capital account expenditure consists of two parts: development and
non-developmental where the former mainly concentrates on creation
of physical assets. Non-developmental part of the capital expenditure
is mainly used for repayments for loans to central governments and
discharge of internal debt.
As stated earlier, the MIMIC model can only yield a time-series
index for the latent variables (the underground economy). However, it
can only give an index for a time-series. Therefore, we need to convert
this ordinal index into a cardinal series of values of hidden economy
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sizes by scaling up the ordinal values to some cardinal value obtained
in the past through other methods of estimation like the electricity or
the currency demand approach and using values from it to calibrate
the ordinal series obtained by the MIMIC approach. Here we have
adopted this option. We have used Bhattacharyya's (1999) hidden
economy estimate for India, of 22.5% for 1989-90, to scale up our
ordinal hidden economy series to arrive at the complete cardinal
underground economy sizes for different states for India.
Given the above estimates, in the next stage, we have tried to
explain whether the civic institutions like media, political institutions or
characteristics of the state governments affect the growth in the size
of the hidden economy estimates (git). The regression equation for this
model takes the standard panel data form:
git = αi + λi + ρlog(Hit−1) + μti + βeit + δfit + ηsit + Øwit + ϕpit + ψlitit +
μprimaryit + θrurit + uit
(5)
where αi is a state fixed effect and λt is a time-dummy
controlling for aggregate shock. The term, Hit−1 is the lagged size of
the hidden economy. We have allowed for the state-specific trend (ti)
in our estimation. The variable fit variable represents the government
characteristics in terms of coalition measuring the proportion of year ‘t’
where a coalition government is in power with more than one pivotal
party. We call this variable as Coalition government. The variable eit
represents an election year dummy taking the value of one if a
scheduled election is held in the second half of financial year t or in the
first half of the next financial year in state i. We have also included two
other variables (sit and wit) in the above equation. The first one
captures the extent of political affiliation between the governments at
the center and the state. Specifically, this is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1(0) if the government in state s is politically
affiliated with the central government for more (less) than 6 months
during financial year t. The second one tries to capture the difference
between a left-wing state government (that is, a government headed
by a communist party) and all other government types. The variable
wit measures the proportion of financial year t during which the
government of state i was a left-wing government. We have also
introduced two other variables in Eq. (5): namely the proportion of
rural population (Rur), and contribution of primary sector (primary)
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(agriculture and allied services) in total net state domestic product.
The variable denoted by pit refers to the growth in per capita total
newspaper circulation while lit refers to the growth in literacy rates.
In Eq. (5), the error term uit is modeled as an AR(1) process
where we allow state-specific degree of autocorrelation. Estimation of
Eq. (5) via generalized least squares also permits us for a
heteroskedastic error structure with each state having its own
variance.8

4. Empirical results
4.1. Data
The data set for our study consists of annual observations from
1974-75 to 1995-96 covering the 14 major states of India. The
fourteen major Indian states are: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat,
Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa,
Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The
variables that we consider partition into two major categories: (1) data
on the indicator variables (Grsdp and Temp) and (2) data on cause
variables. The real net state domestic product is obtained from various
issues of the National Accounts Statistics (Government of India,
Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics), published by the
Central Statistical Organization of the Government of India. The
employment data for the registered manufacturing industries were
complied from various issues of the Annual Survey of Indian
Industries, Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation,
Government of India. The data on cause variables such as tax and
expenditure variables of state governments were collected from
various volumes of the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, published by
the Central bank of India.
State demographic characteristic like the contribution of the
primary sector is constructed using the National Accounts Statistics.
The literacy rates are collected from Census of India and the National
Sample Survey rounds (both published by the Government of India).
For some years, state literacy rate data were not available from either
the Census of India or the National Sample Survey rounds. For these
years, we have interpolated the data using a simple growth rate
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formula. We obtain the per capita newspaper circulation figures from
Press in India (published by the Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting). We have also experiment with total vernacular
language newspaper circulation, total English newspaper circulation,
total second language newspaper circulation and total other language
newspaper circulation. All these come from Press in India. Our data on
political variables comes from multiple sources. First, the dates of all
state legislative assembly elections were taken from the book India
Decides (Butler et al., 1996) and from the official website of Election
Commission of India.9 Thereafter, for each state-year combination, the
“nature” of the state government (coalition, political. affiliation and
ideology was determined. We have collected this information from the
publication Encyclopedia of India and Her States (Grover and Arora,
1998).

4.2. Results
This section is divided in two parts: Section 4.2.1 reports the
results for the MIMIC model where as the results from the estimation
of Eq. (5) is reported in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1. The MIMIC model’s estimates of the hidden economy of

Indian states
In this sub-section, we present the hidden economy estimates
of the Indian states. We have estimated the MIMIC model separately
for individual states.10 For an illustrative purpose, however in Table 1
we present the results for four states, namely, Andhra Pradesh,
Kerala, Maharashtra and West Bengal. Our results clearly indicate the
following: although the causal variables enter in general with expected
signs, however, many of them lack individual significance. Table 2
reports the diagnostic statistics for the estimated model. Small values
of root mean square residual (RMR) where as large values of the
adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), and the parsimony goodness of
fit index (PGFI), reflect a good model fit. In almost all the models, the
diagnostic statistics give a satisfactory result in terms of model fit. In
Table 3, we present the results for the size of the underground
economy of Indian states for four samples: 1974/75-1980/81,
1981/82-1985/86, 1986/87-1991/92 and 1992/93-1995/96. Table 3
depicts some interesting pictures: for the entire period, state of
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Haryana has the lowest size of underground economy followed closely
by the southern state of Tamil Nadu while that of Bihar is the highest.
The southern states namely, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and
Tamil Nadu represent lower underground economy in comparison with
other states of India. Three of five BIMARU11 states have an average
size of under-ground economy that is larger than that of all-14
average. States like Haryana, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh
and West Bengal show a considerable size of the hidden economy in
the post-liberalization era (1992/93-1995/96) compared to the entire
period.
In Fig. 1, we also provide a diagrammatic exposition of the
average size of the hidden economy for fourteen major states along
with that of all-India.12 In this figure, the column all-14 represents a
simple average for the fourteen major states. For the sample period,
the hidden economy for all-India stands at 20.35% of GDP. The size of
the hidden economy has increased from 15.39% (1974/75) to 23-21%
(1995/96). States as Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Punjab, and Rajasthan had experienced a higher size on an average
compared to all-India figure.
A comparison of the estimated size of the hidden economy for
the all-India along with some other Asian countries (reported in
Appendix A)13 reveals that Thailand has by far, for the year 1994/95,
the biggest shadow economy with 48.3% of the official GDP, followed
by the Philippines with 38.4% and Sri Lanka with 35.3%. In the middle
field is Taiwan with 17.4%, India with 20.3% and South Korea with
22.4%. At the lower end is China with 10.2%, Japan with 10.6% and
Singapore with 11.2% of the “official” GDP.
In order to get a better understanding, we also calculate the
growth rate of the underground economy for the pre-liberalization
(1975/76-1991/92) and post-liberalization (1992/93-1995/ 96) for
Indian states and report the results in Table 4. In the postliberalization era, the growth in the size of the underground is lower is
most states except Haryana, Kerala, Rajasthan and West Bengal. The
state of Rajasthan had the highest average growth rate in the postliberalization period whereas Andhra Pradesh had the lowest one. In
the pre-liberalization era, Kerala experienced the lowest average
growth rate where as that of Orissa was the highest.
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4.2.2. Explaining the size of the hidden economy of Indian states
In order to explain the size of the hidden economy, we ran the
regression as given in Eq. (5). The result is reported in Table 5.
Column 1 of Table 5 presents the regression results where we just
used the political variables, namely the scheduled election, the
coalition government, the match dummy, ideology of the government
and the liberalization dummy. The lagged value of the hidden economy
is negative and significant implying the evidence of convergence. Our
results show that the growth in the size of the hidden economy is
approximately 5% less in scheduled election years than in all other
years. The coefficient associated with the Coalition Government is
negative and statistically significant. The estimates reveal that the
growth in the size of the hidden economy is around 3% less if the
coalition is in power compared to a single-party government. The
trend term is significant implying that the hidden economy is growing
for the Indian states significantly. We also obtain the fact that the
state where the left-wing government (Ideology) is in power the
growth in the size of the hidden economy is less. The liberalization of
the Indian economy that took place in 1991/92 also exerts a negative
significant impact.
In order to examine the robustness of the results reported in
Column 1, in column 2, we introduced the following variable as a
determinant of the growth in the Indian economy: the contribution of
the primary sector (agriculture and allied services) in net state
domestic product and proportion of rural population as control
variables. Our results in terms of the political variable (the election
dummy, coalition government, match dummy and ideology of the
government) remain the same except the fact that both the match
dummy and ideology becomes significant. Our result infers that state
that has the same political party in power as in the Center is less
active in terms of curbing the growth in the size of the hidden
economy. We also note that an increase in the contribution of the
primary sector significantly reduces the growth in the size of the
hidden economy.
Next, we try to focus on the role of print-media. In column 3
Table 5 we have introduced both the growth in literacy rates and that
in per capita total newspaper circulation. The reported results
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document that both the variables yield the expected negative sign,
although the effect is significant only in case of growth in per capita
total newspaper circulation. This shows that state governments are
more responsive to reduce the size of the hidden economy in those
states where newspaper circulation is higher. In column (4) of Table 5,
we have used growth in per capita newspaper circulation published in
vernacular language instead of per capita total newspaper circulation.
The coefficient associated with the variable is negative, although not
significant. Our results almost remain the same with respect to other
variables.
We have used the scheduled election years only. However, if the
regressions are re-estimated without differentiating between scheduled
and mid-term elections, our reported results in Table 5 remains the
same with the election variable enters with a negative and significant
coefficient. Second, the effects of government fragmentation are
robust and do not depend on how the election year dummy is coded.
Third, the coefficient associated with the match dummy variabIe
remains unaltered.14 However, the ideology variable loses its
significance.
Given these results, we ran another regression where we
include the mid-term election as a separate variable along with the
scheduled election to differentiate the impact of these two different
types of elections. Here we obtain that both the scheduled and the
mid-term election enters with negative significant coefficient.15 A test
for the difference in estimated coefficients associated with these two
variables reveals significant difference in the estimated coefficients at
the 10 percent level. The results in terms of the other variable remain
qualitatively the same.16
In sum, we can infer that the growth in the size of the hidden
economy is significantly lower in election years than all other years. A
state where the coalition government is in power also experiences
lower increase in the growth compared to single-party governments.
Our results also provide some weak evidence that an increased growth
in literacy rates and newspaper circulation results in a lower growth
rate in the size of the hidden economy. We also document that
increased competition in terms of liberalization of the Indian economy
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in 1991 also helps to reduce the growth in the size of the underground
economy.

5. Conclusion
This paper tries to estimate the size of the hidden economy using
state level data from India over the period 1974/75 to 1995/96. We
have used a MIMIC model. The estimates from the MIMIC model
demonstrate the varying size of the hidden economy in Indian states.
On an average, the size has grown from 13.1% to 26.3%.
We have also shown that an increased growth of per capita
newspaper circulation helps to curb the growth in the size of the
shadow economy activities in the economy. This focuses on the
importance of free and independent regional presses as key factors for
proper functioning of the democracy. Our result also demonstrates
that the state governments are active during the election to provide a
cleaner picture of the economy. Elections act as an incentive for
politicians to perform. The growth in the size of the hidden economy is
lower if the coalition government is in power. Our result also provides
evidence in favor of liberalization of the Indian economy in order to
reduce the growth in the size of the hidden economy.
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1

Tel.: +43 70 2468 8210; fax: +43 70 2468 8209.

2

See the Economic Journal, vol. 109, no. 456, June 1999 the feature
“Controversy: on the hidden economy”.

3

The literature about the “shadow”, “underground”, “informal”, “second”,
“cash” or “parallel”, economy is increasing. Various topics, on how to
measure it, its causes, and its effect on the official economy are
analyzed. See for example, survey type publications by Frey and
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Pommerehne (1984); Johnson et al. (1997, 1998); Lippert and Walker
(1997); Loayza (1996); Pozo (1996); Schneider (l994a,b, 1997, 1998,
2005) and Thomas (1992); and for an overall survey of the global
evidence of its size in terms of value added Schneider and Enste
(2000, 2002).
4

This definition is used for example, by Feige (1989, 1994), Frey and
Pommerehne (1984), and Lubell (1991) and Schneider (1994a, 2005).

5

Kaldor (1956) tried to estimate the size of the hidden economy in India, by
estimating the income that avoided the income tax.

6

We have also tried using the growth in per capita real net state domestic
product instead of growth in real net state domestic product. Our
results in terms of the size of the hidden economy remain almost the
same. The results are available on request.

7

On an average, this amounts to around 87-88% of total state tax revenue.

8

Besley and Burgess (2000) have also followed this kind of estimation
strategy.

9

http://www.eci.gov.in.

10

Although we do not provide the estimates for each one of them, the results,
however, are available for the authors on request.

11

The BIMARU states are Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, and
Uttar Pradesh.

12

For the estimation of the hidden economy at the all-India level, please see
Chattopadhyay et al. (2003).

13

The calculationof the shadow economy for China is very difficult and the
values may be questioned because only a part of China has so far
been developed into a market economy. A great part of China still
belongs to a planed economy and due to this mix of systems, the
calculated figures may not be very reliable.

14

The coefficient is 0.041 with a p-value of 0.000.

15

The coefficient associated with the scheduled election is -0.048 and that of
mid-term election is -0.028. The test for the difference in the
estimated coefficients associated with these two variables yields a test
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statistic of 2.79 distributed as χ2 with one degree of freedom. This is
significant at the 10% level.
16

The detailed results are available on request.
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Appendix
Table 1: MIMIC model results

t-Statistics are reported in parenthesis.
* Denotes significance at 10% level.
** Denotes significance at 5% level.
*** Denotes significance at 1% level.
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Table 2: Diagnostic statistics of the estimated MIMIC model

Table 3: Size of the hidden economy for states of India as a percent of measured net
state domestic product.
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Table 4: Growth in size of the hidden economy for states of India

Table 5: Regression results: growth in the size of the hidden economy

Numbers in parentheses are the calculated Z-statistics.
*Denotes significance at the 10% level.
**Denotes significance at the 5% level.
***Denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Figure 1: Average size (1974/75-1995/96) of the hidden economy of 14 Indian
states

Appendix A: Size of the hidden economy for some Asian countries (percent of
official GDP in 1994/95)
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